Understanding recurrent crime as system-immanent collective behavior by Perc, Matjaz et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
8.
43
98
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
0 A
ug
 20
13
Understanding recurrent crime as system-immanent collective behavior
Matjazˇ Perc,1, ∗ Karsten Donnay,2 and Dirk Helbing2, 3
1Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Korosˇka cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
2ETH Zurich, CLU E1, Chair of Sociology, in particular of Modeling and Simulation, Clausiusstrasse 50, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
3Risk Center, ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Scheuchzerstrasse 7, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
Containing the spreading of crime is a major challenge for society. Yet, since thousands of years, no ef-
fective strategy has been found to overcome crime. To the contrary, empirical evidence shows that crime is
recurrent, a fact that is not captured well by rational choice theories of crime. According to these, strong enough
punishment should prevent crime from happening. To gain a better understanding of the relationship between
crime and punishment, we consider that the latter requires prior discovery of illicit behavior and study a spatial
version of the inspection game. Simulations reveal the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance between
“criminals”, “inspectors”, and “ordinary people” as a consequence of spatial interactions. Such cycles dominate
the evolutionary process, in particular when the temptation to commit crime or the cost of inspection are low or
moderate. Yet, there are also critical parameter values beyond which cycles cease to exist and the population
is dominated either by a stable mixture of criminals and inspectors or one of these two strategies alone. Both
continuous and discontinuous phase transitions to different final states are possible, indicating that successful
strategies to contain crime can be very much counter-intuitive and complex. Our results demonstrate that spatial
interactions are crucial for the evolutionary outcome of the inspection game, and they also reveal why crimi-
nal behavior is likely to be recurrent rather than evolving towards an equilibrium with monotonous parameter
dependencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crime may be seen as human activity that deviates from
social norms in intolerable ways. Despite our best efforts to
fight it, crime continues to plague society since thousands of
years and endanger its very foundation: social order. To con-
tain criminal activity, societies enforce social norms by “pool
punishment” (through institutions such as the police) [1–3] or
“peer punishment” (i.e. decentralized, individual sanctioning
efforts) [4–8]. In this paper, we will focus on peer punishment,
which has also been discussed as “altruistic punishment” [9–
12] or “costly punishment” [13–16]. In contrast to previous
work, however, we will take into account that the detection of
crime requires a costly inspection effort.
Empirical data show that crimes, regardless of type and
severity, are often recurrent [17, 18]. The robbery rate in
the United States, for example, began to rise steadily in the
1960s and oscillated at around 200 robberies per 100,000 for
20 years. It only started to significantly decline in the 1990s
(see Fig. 1). Notably, the significantly reduced robbery rates
in the United States after the year 2000 remain higher than in
many other Western democracies but are much lower than in
Belgium or Spain, the countries experiencing the highest rob-
bery rates worldwide with well more than 1000 robberies per
100,000 [19].
Although large efforts are invested to deter and prevent
crime, it reappears over and over again, sometimes in more
vigorous forms than before. According to rational choice the-
ories of crime, strong enough punishment should be able to
prevent it. Yet for thousands of years, and regardless of how
strong sanctions are, they fail to prevent crime. Until today,
a fully satisfactory explanation of the mechanism behind the
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FIG. 1: Empirical evidence for the recurrent nature of crime, depict-
ing the number of robberies per 100,000 population. Next to the aver-
age for the United States (black), the figure shows averages of states
with very high (blue), high (green), moderate (red) and low (grey)
robbery rates. The four categories are obtained through grouping
states by their average robbery rate over the period 1965-2010 and
then assigning the 25% most affected states to the first category, the
25% next most affected states to the second category, etc. Exam-
ples of states with very high robbery rates are Washington D.C. and
New York. States with low robbery rates are, for instance, North
Dakota and Utah. In states with very high robbery rates, the number
of robberies oscillates considerably over time. In states with high
and moderate robbery rates numbers follow the same up and down
trends but at significantly lower levels and with smaller variations. In
the states with low robbery rates numbers are very low and remain
more or less stable over time. Similar dependencies are found for
other kinds of crime such as motor vehicle theft and property crime.
recurrent nature of crime is still lacking.
In fact, researchers have struggled to find consistent ex-
planations for the recurrence of crime and its trends in the
past 50 years. Beside structural factors, such as unemploy-
ment [20, 21] and economic deprivation [22], studies have
highlighted the influence of demography [23], youth culture
[24, 25], social institutions [26] and urban development [27],
2but also of political legitimacy [22], law enforcement strate-
gies [28, 29], and the criminal justice system [23]. Recent
work in criminology emphasizes that trends in the levels of
crime may be best understood as arising from a complex in-
terplay of these factors [27, 30].
In this paper, we adopt this point of view and show that
fighting crime is in fact not a simple gain-loss type of activ-
ity which can be understood by “linear thinking”. Increasing
one factor will not necessarily lead to a monotonous change
in another, but may have a rather different, counter-intuitive
or hardly foreseeable impact. Furthermore, note that crime
patterns feature typical characteristics of complex system be-
havior. Commentators agree that the same general set of fac-
tors affected crime rates in the past 50 years, yet the crime
statistics show significantly different phases throughout that
period. Changes from one phase to the next occur suddenly:
for example, nobody expected the decline in the 1990s. In
fact, analysts predicted rising crime rates [31, 32].
Recognizing the complex interactions of crime and its sanc-
tioning, is it possible to understand why increased punishment
fines do not necessarily reduce crime rates [33], as one might
expect [34]? For example, why do murders still happen in
countries with death penalty, despite the high discovery rate
of murderers?
The occurrence of anti-social punishment in certain coun-
tries adds further empirical evidence to the counter-intuitive
nature of punishment efforts [35]. For these and further rea-
sons, some scientists even question the effectiveness of pun-
ishment strategies in general and have suggested that rewards
for desirable behaviors might in fact be more effective [36–
38].
To some extend, crime might be considered as a social
dilemma situation. It would be favorable for all, if nobody
committed a crime, but there are individual incentives to do
so. As large-scale corruption and tax evasion in some trou-
bled countries or mafia and drug wars show, “tragedy of the
commons” are actually possible [39]. In fact, if nobody is
watching, criminal behavior (such as stealing) may seem ra-
tional, since it promises ample reward g > 0 for little effort.
To change this, it appears logical to modify the decision situ-
ation through a fine f > 0 in such a way that the probability p
of catching a criminal times the imposed fine f eliminates the
reward of the crime, i.e.
g − pf < 0 . (1)
However, the success of this strategy depends on the prob-
ability of catching a criminal, and this requires an inspection
effort. With this in mind, we here study criminal activity in the
context of a simple, evolutionary game-theoretical model [40]
based on the inspection game—a well established model in
the sociological literature for the dynamics of crime [41, 42].
The game addresses the question of why anybody would be
willing to invest into costly inspection activity. The problem
is related to a “second-order free-rider dilemma” [43, 44], as
individuals are tempted to benefit from the inspection activi-
ties of others without contributing to them.
In order to overcome the second-order free-rider dilemma
[45], our contribution analyzes the effect of spatial interac-
tions [46–57] in the inspection game. Introducing this aspect
has a profound impact on the overall dynamics. The original
version of the inspection game implies that stronger punish-
ment would decrease inspection rates rather than crime. Com-
pared to this, studying the spatiotemporal dynamics of crime
[58–60], as we do it, gives a somewhat different and more dif-
ferentiated picture. Taking into account spatial interactions,
i.e. the fact that not everybody is connected with everybody
else, reveals the origin of the recurrent nature of crime. Our
results demonstrate that crime is indeed expected to be recur-
rent as long as there is a gain associated with criminal activ-
ity. Furthermore, by systematically exploring the parameter
dependencies, we find different kinds of possible outcomes
(“phases”), some of which display a very interesting dynam-
ics. In particular, we reveal continuous and discontinuous
phase transitions to different final states.
The level of complexity governing criminal activities in
competition with sanctioning efforts appears to be much
greater than it has been assumed so far. Our results may help
to explain the counterintuitive impact of punishment on the
occurrence of crime. To interpret our results, it is important
to consider intricate spatial interaction patterns. The emer-
gent collective behaviors cannot be predicted solely by look-
ing at the interactions between individual agents, but must be
attributed to forces of self-organization, which suddenly ap-
pear when critical parameter thresholds are crossed.
II. RESULTS
A. Spatial inspection game
We study the spatial inspection game on a fully occupied
L× L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Sim-
ulated individuals (so-called agents) play the game with their
k = 4 nearest neighbors. Alternatively, we consider regular
small-world graphs where a fraction λ of all links is randomly
rewired. The game involves three kinds of strategies sx, be-
tween which the players x are assumed to change, depend-
ing of the success they expect from their respective strategy.
These behavioral strategies are those of “criminals” (sx = C),
punishing “inspectors” (sx = P ), and “ordinary individuals”
(sx = O), who neither commit crimes nor participate in in-
spection activities.
Ordinary people receive no payoffs when encountering in-
spectors or other ordinary individuals. Only when faced with
criminals, they suffer the consequences of crime in form of
a negative payoff −g ≤ 0. The criminals, when facing or-
dinary individuals, make the equivalent gain g ≥ 0. When
facing inspectors, however, criminals obtain the payoff g− f ,
where f ≥ 0 is a punishment fine. If faced with each other,
none of two interacting criminals is assumed to have a benefit.
Inspectors, on the other hand, always have the cost of inspec-
tion, c ≥ 0, but when confronted with a criminal, an inspector
receives the reward r ≥ 0, i.e. the related payoff is r − c.
According to the standard parametrization of the inspec-
tion game, we have four parameters that determine the set-
up. For convenience, however, and in order to decrease the
3dimensionality of the parameters space, we re-scale the pa-
rameters to obtain three dimensionless parameters character-
izing the inspection game. These are the “(relative) inspec-
tion costs” α = c/f , which determine how costly inspec-
tion is compared to the imposed fines, the “(relative) temp-
tation” β = g/f , which determines how tempted individuals
are to commit crimes, and the “(relative) inspection incentive”
γ = r/f , which determines the efficiency of sanctioning ef-
forts. If γ < 1, the fines imposed on criminals are not com-
pletely turned into rewards, while γ > 1 means that inspection
is subsidized by the state or creates some interest rates or syn-
ergy effects. In terms of the parameters α, β and γ, the scaled
payoffs of ordinary individuals, inspectors and criminals can
be expressed as:
piO = −βNC , (2)
piP = γNC − α, (3)
piC = βNO + (β − 1)NP . (4)
Here NO , NP and NC are the numbers of ordinary individu-
als, inspectors and criminals among the k = 4 nearest neigh-
bors.
B. Evolutionary dynamics
For comparison, let us first summarize the behavior of the
traditional two-strategy inspection game in a non-spatial set-
ting. Assuming that individuals interact randomly and spread
relative to their payoffs, the governing replicator equation
[61] predicts that the probability of committing a crime is
c/r = α/γ and the probability of inspection is g/f = β.
Accordingly, as soon as α ≥ γ the whole population is dom-
inated by criminals, while for α < γ criminals and inspec-
tors coexist in different proportions depending on β. These
basic considerations indicate a relatively simple and smooth
dependence on the model parameters α, β, and γ, but they
also suggest that higher punishment implies less inspection,
which sounds questionable and is in fact frequently subject to
critique [62].
The collective behavior of the proposed three-strategy spa-
tial inspection game is much more complex, and also counter-
intuitive. In contrast to the traditional case of well-mixed
interactions briefly discussed before, we find various phase
transitions between different kinds of collective outcomes, as
demonstrated in Fig. 2. We find four different phases:
1. a dominance of criminals for high temptation β and
high inspection costs α,
2. a coexistence of criminals and punishing inspectors (the
P +C phase) for large values of temptation β and mod-
erate inspection costs α,
3. a dominance of police for moderate inspection costs α
and low values of temptation β, but only if the inspec-
tion incentives γ are moderate [see panel (A)], and
4. cyclical dominance for small inspection costs α and
small temptation β, where criminals outperform or-
dinary individuals, while these outperform punishing
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FIG. 2: Phase diagrams, demonstrating the spontaneous emergence
and stability of the recurrent nature of crime and other possible out-
comes of the evolutionary competition of criminals (C), ordinary in-
dividuals (O) and punishing inspectors (P ). The diagrams show the
strategies remaining on the square lattice after sufficiently long re-
laxation times as a function of the (relative) inspection costs α and
the (relative) temptation β, (A) for inspection incentive γ = 0.5 and
(B) for γ = 1.0. The overlayed color map encodes the crime rate,
i.e. the stationary density of criminals in the system. (A) For small
and intermediate values of α and β, cyclic dominance between the
three strategies characterizes the evolutionary dynamics. Criminals
outperform ordinary people, ordinary people outperform inspectors,
and inspectors outperform criminals. This cyclic dominance leads
to recurrent outbreaks of crime during the evolutionary process. If
either α or β exceed a certain threshold, the cyclic phase ends with
a continuous phase transition to a mixed P + C phase (lower solid
line), where inspectors and criminals coexist. Further increasing the
two parameters leads to another continuous transition (upper solid
line) and an absorbing C phase, where criminals dominate. In other
words, when a certain value of temptation β is exceeded, it cannot
be compensated by larger inspection costs α anymore. A re-entry
into the cyclic C +O+ P phase is possible through a succession of
two discontinuous phase transitions (dashed lines) occurring for suf-
ficiently small β and decreasing inspection costs. First, the absorb-
ing C phase changes abruptly to an absorbing P phase dominated by
inspectors, which then changes abruptly to the cyclic phase. (B) In-
creasing the value of γ increases the region of cyclic dominance, but
also eliminates the possibility of complete dominance of inspectors.
Qualitatively, however, the evolutionary dynamics within the differ-
ent phases does not change compared to γ = 0.5, and remains the
same also for γ > 1. Dash-dotted gray lines in A and B correspond
to the condition p = β, i.e. where the probability for criminals to be
detected is the same as the temptation to commit crime, and a transi-
tion to criminal behavior would be expected according to the rational
choice equation (1).
inspectors, and those win against the criminals (the
C +O + P phase).
The phase transitions are either continuous (solid lines in
Fig. 2) or discontinuous (dashed lines in Fig. 2), and this dif-
fers markedly from what would be expected according to the
rational choice equation (1) or the well-mixed model due to
the significant effects of inspection and spatial interactions.
Starting in the cyclical dominanceC+O+P phase and go-
ing clockwise around the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 2(A),
we find that, as the temptation β increases towards the lower
solid line, the invasion of criminals into area of the ordinary
individuals becomes more and more effective. This is ex-
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FIG. 3: Representative cross-sections of phase diagrams, invalidat-
ing straightforward gain-loss principles (“linear thinking”) as proper
description of the relationship between crime, inspection and pun-
ishment rates. As the inspection costs α increase, there are virtually
no clear trends regarding the impact that such changes have on the
outcome of the evolutionary process. (A) For β = 0.2 and γ = 0.5,
increasing α initially leaves the stationary densities of strategies al-
most unaffected, while a discontinuous first-order phase transition to
complete dominance of inspectors occurs at α = 0.5625. Another
discontinuous first-order phase transitions follows at α = 0.6075,
where the dominance of inspectors is replaced by the dominance of
criminals. (B) For β = 0.4 and γ = 1.0, ordinary people first dis-
appear in a second-order continuous phase transition at α = 0.765,
thereby terminating the cyclic C + O + P phase. In the following
mixed P+C phase, the impact of increasing inspection costs α leads
to an increase in the number of criminals, which finally gives rise to a
complete dominance through another second-order continuous phase
transition occurring at α = 0.925. It is worth noting that the impact
of increasing temptation β at a fixed value of α is analogous.
pected because the profits of criminals increase with increas-
ing values of β. Consequently, at the transition point, ordi-
nary individuals die out. The ordeals of ordinary individuals,
however, negatively affect also the criminals because there is
increasing shortage of those left to invade. This is counter-
intuitive, but in fact common in spatial models of cyclical
interactions [63], where the fierce competition between two
strategies (in our case ordinary individuals and criminals) fre-
quently leads to the flourishing of the third strategy (in our
case the inspectors). The overlayed color map conveys clearly
that this effect indeed drastically lowers the crime rate near the
C+O+P → P+C transition line. Once in the P+C phase,
however, increasing values of β add strength to the criminals,
which makes it increasingly difficult for the inspectors to con-
tain crime. The crime rate therefore increases until eventually
the pure C phase is reached through the second continuous
phase transition (upper solid line).
Continuing clockwise from the pure C phase, we enter into
the pure P phase by means of a discontinuous first-order
phase transition that emerges suddenly for sufficiently low
values of the temptation β and the inspection costs α. The rea-
son for the discontinuous first-order phase transition is an indi-
rect competition between the inspectors and the criminals, the
mediators of which are the ordinary individuals. If the inspec-
tors succumb to ordinary individuals before forming a suffi-
ciently large compact cluster, the criminals are subsequently
able to eliminate all the ordinary individual to form the pureC
phase. If, on the other hand, inspectors are able to prevail long
enough for criminals to eliminate the ordinary individuals, the
final battle between the inspectors and the criminals is won by
the former, thus yielding a pure P phase. The transition be-
tween these two outcomes is sudden and imminent, and it can
be triggered either by lowering the value of β or the value of
α (or both).
As the inspections costs α are lowered further, however, the
pure P phase gives way to the C + O + P phase via another
discontinuous first-order phase transition. The latter emerges
because, at sufficiently low values of α, the inspectors can sur-
vive alongside ordinary individuals long enough to establish a
cyclic dominance relation together with the criminals. As de-
scribed before, in the C + O + P phase ordinary individuals
invade the inspectors, inspectors invade the criminals, who in
turn invade the ordinary individuals.
Notably, for γ = 1 [see Fig. 2(B)] the phases and the evo-
lutionary outcomes are very similar, with the only difference
that the pure P phase does not emerge. This is because higher
values of γ act similarly on the inspectors as lower values of
α. Accordingly, compared to the γ = 0.5 [see Fig. 2(A)]
case, the phase transition lines move towards larger values of
α, and the intricate indirect competition between the inspec-
tors and the criminals always results in either a pure C phase
or a mixedP+C phase, which is separated from theC+O+P
phase.
Figure 3 features a more detailed quantitative analysis, dis-
playing in panel (A) the sudden first-order phase transitions
from the C + O + P phase to the pure P phase, and from
the pure P phase to the pure C phase as inspection costs α
increase. In panel (B), we can observe the second-order phase
transitions, first from the C+O+P phase to the P+C phase,
and then from the P +C phase to the pure C phase. It follows
that the exact impact of each specific parameter variation de-
pends strongly on the location within the phase diagram, i.e.
the exact parameter combination. General statements like “in-
creasing the fine reduces criminal activity” tend to be wrong,
which contradicts the established point of view. This may ex-
plain why empirical evidence is not in agreement with exist-
ing theoretical expectations, and it also suggests we ought to
reconsider the common perspective on crime. Our model, al-
though minimalist, allows to conclude that “linear thinking”
brakes down as a means to devise successful crime prevention
policies.
Snapshots presented in Fig. 4 further underline the complex
evolutionary dynamics that underlies the prevention of crime.
Depending on the parameter values, minute but compact clus-
ters of the seemingly defeated strategy [criminals in panel
(B), inspectors in panel (F), ordinary individuals in panel (J)]
can resurrect, forming invasion fronts that are characteristic
for cyclic dominance. Eventually, a dynamical equilibrium is
reached in which all three strategies coexist in varying abun-
dance.
It is also possible to derive implications for vanishing val-
ues of α and β that are very difficult to capture by means of
simulations, and which may constitute the starting point for
a separate study. For example, in the limit of vanishing (rel-
ative) inspection costs α and vanishing (relative) temptation
5FIG. 4: Snapshots of three different realizations of the cyclic C +
O+P phase, revealing the microscopic dynamics behind the cycles
of crime. Invasion fronts can be either led by the criminals (red),
by the inspectors (green), or by ordinary individuals (blue). (A-D)
For small inspection costs α = 0.05, large temptation β = 1.0
and medium inspection incentives γ = 0.5, the situation is ini-
tially dominated by inspectors, after which clusters of ordinary in-
dividuals spread. Then, a front of criminals invades the area of
ordinary individuals, but they are chased by inspectors. As a re-
sult, inspectors prevail, with clusters of ordinary individuals and
a few criminals in between. (E-H) For medium inspection costs
α = 0.2, small temptation β = 0.05 and medium inspection in-
centives γ = 0.5, the situation is first dominated by ordinary in-
dividuals, then by criminals. Afterwards, inspectors form an inva-
sion front entering the domain of criminals, followed by ordinary
individuals. Eventually, the situation is dominated by ordinary indi-
viduals with some inspectors and criminal enclaves in between. (I-
L) For even higher inspection costs α = 0.5, moderate temptation
β = 0.25 and medium inspection incentives γ = 0.5, the evolution-
ary process is dominated by criminals in the early stage and later by
inspectors. Finally, however, inspectors and criminals prevail, with
a few clusters of ordinary individuals in between. Supplementary
videos showing all three evolutionary processes from the beginning
until the convergence to the stationary distribution of strategies are
available at the following links: (A-D) youtube.com/watch?v=pH9l-
2h6PRo, (E-H) youtube.com/watch?v=gVnCN3a9ki8 and (I-L)
youtube.com/watch?v=ehlDSde3BM4.
β (i.e. α = β = 0), inspectors outperform criminals, and a
mixed phase of ordinary individuals and inspectors remains.
As both strategies receive equal payoffs for α = β = 0, the
finally winning strategy is the outcome of a logarithmically
slow coarsening process [64]. The victor is usually the strat-
egy that occupies the larger portion of the lattice at the time
of extinction of the first strategy (the criminals). However, if
the inspection costs α increase only slightly while the tempta-
tion β stays zero, the equivalence of ordinary individuals and
inspectors is immediately broken in the favor of the former,
so that ordinary people tend to dominate quickly. Notably,
for β = 0, the strategies of ordinary individuals and crimi-
nals are also equivalent. Therefore, the winner of the strug-
gle between ordinary individuals and criminals is again deter-
mined by logarithmically slow coarsening if, by any chance,
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FIG. 5: Robustness of crime cycles against the variation of net-
work topology. The social interaction networks were constructed by
rewiring links of a square lattice of size 400 × 400 with probabil-
ity λ. For low values of λ, small-world properties emerge, while for
λ→ 1 we have a random regular graph. As λ is small and increases,
the stationary fractions of the three competing strategies remain al-
most the same. However, due to the increasing interconnectedness of
the players, the amplitude of oscillations increases. When a critical
threshold value of λ is reached, the maxima become comparable to
the system size and oscillations terminate abruptly. The winner is
the strategy that mediates the evolutionary competition between the
two other strategies. (A) For small inspection costs α = 0.05, large
temptation β = 1.0 and moderate inspection incentives γ = 0.5,
ordinary people are the winners [see the evolution in panels (A-D)
in Fig. 4, in particular panel (C)]. (B) For moderate inspection costs
α = 0.2, small temptation β = 0.05, and medium inspection incen-
tives γ = 0.5, criminals are the winners [see the evolution in panels
(E-H) in Fig. 4, in particular panel (G)]. While cycles of crime are in
general robust to variations of the network structure, the globaliza-
tion by shortcut links adds another layer of complexity to the game
that can result in the emergence of discontinuous phase transitions to
absorbing states, for example, the prevalence of ordinary individuals
(but not necessarily so). Note, however, that the evolutionary dy-
namics becomes more and more fragile as the cycles escalate [inset
in (B)] shows the envelope of oscillations of ρO), until they even-
tually involve almost the whole population. A supplementary video
depicting such an evolutionary process where criminals are the vic-
tors is available at youtube.com/watch?v=oGNOmLognOY. The fi-
nal outcome of this dynamics may be hard to predict, especially if the
population size is small and the strategies become subject to random
extinction.
inspectors die out before they outperform the criminals. In-
creasing the temptation β slightly above zero does not affect
the competition between ordinary individuals and inspectors
at low inspection costs α. Yet, it helps criminals to convert
more and more ordinary individuals, before they are finally
overwhelmed by the evolutionary pressure of the inspectors.
Accordingly, for small values of temptation β, inspectors will
most likely be the winners of the logarithmically slow coars-
ening.
Last but not least, we have also studied the relevance of
the network structure. Figure 5 present results for a periodic
grid, in which a certain fraction λ of links has been randomly
rewired, thereby creating a regular small-world network for
small values of λ and a regular random network for λ = 1
[65]. It turns out that the conclusions for these interaction
networks stay qualitatively the same. However, between 5%
and 10% of shortcut links, we find discontinuous first-order
6phase transitions, which are related to a sudden extinction of
two strategies. Which two these are depends on the location
within the C + O + P phase, and is directly related to the
highest peaks of abundance during the oscillatory dynamics.
In fact, beyond a certain value of λ, shortcuts drastically in-
crease the amplitude of oscillations, to the point that it be-
comes system-wide regardless of the system size, as depicted
in the inset of Fig. 5(B). Extinction thus becomes inevitable,
which gives rise to abrupt changes in the evolutionary dynam-
ics, and it creates shocks of abundance of either criminals,
inspectors or ordinary individuals. These results also indicate
that the social structure of interaction networks adds another
layer of complexity to crime containment. This does not have
to do solely with interaction among us being limited rather
than well-mixed, but also with the few long-range interaction
creating globalization effects that emerge suddenly and with-
out any (or very subtle) prior warning.
III. DISCUSSION
Crime remains one of the plagues of society despite best
efforts to fight it. According to classical rational choice the-
ory, crime should disappear when the punishment, multiplied
with the probability to get fined, exceeds the benefits of a
crime. Hence, large enough fines should be able to eliminate
crime. Nevertheless, crime occurs in all societies, indepen-
dently of how harsh the punishment may be. A new approach
may, therefore, be needed. Our paper discusses the possible
emergent/system-immanent nature of crime. Based on a spa-
tial evolutionary game theoretical model, it studies a situation
in which individuals can engage in three kinds of activities:
to commit a crime, to inspect and punish, or to do neither of
both. The model considers the level of temptation to com-
mit a crime as well as the inspection costs and the punish-
ment intensity. We discover a non-monotonous dependence
of the system behavior and level of crime as a function of
the temptation and inspection costs as compared to the pun-
ishment intensity. In particular, we find sudden transitions to
unexpected system behaviors at certain tipping points. This
counter-intuitive result can only be understood as outcome of
an emergent, collective dynamics, as it can occur in complex
evolutionary systems.
Studying the evolutionary dynamics of crime makes some
empirical features better comprehensible, which cannot be ex-
plained with conventional models of crime. This particularly
concerns the circumstance that higher punishment fines do not
necessarily imply less crime. In fact, the contrary could hap-
pen. Evolutionary game-theoretical models may thus provide
unique insights into how the “social immune system” to fight
crime actually works, which is a critical prerequisite for the
development of new and improved crime containment strate-
gies. For example, while the use of surveillance technolo-
gies may reduce relative inspection costs, our results suggest
that they are unable to eliminate crime. Besides inspection
costs, inspection incentives matter as well. A lot of crime and
corruption happens, because incentives to reveal them are too
low.
The results of our computer simulations suggest that crimi-
nals cannot be completely eliminated, when criminal activity
creates a gain. On the other extreme, if the temptation β is too
high, the situation can get totally out of control, ending in a
tragedy of the commons where everybody exploits everybody
else. This situation has been described as primordial state of
society with the words “homo hominis lupus” (“people are
like wolves to each others”) [66]. This state may indeed occur
as result of the breakdown of public order, e.g. after large-
scale disasters. To be controllable, the gain of criminal activ-
ity must stay below a certain critical threshold, and the relative
inspection costs must be sufficiently low. Finding the right
level of the punishment fine is crucial.
Furthermore, note that the inherent cyclical dynamics of
crime, which becomes apparent in our study, might also lead
to regulatory cycles [67]. Cyclical changes between conser-
vative and liberal times are well-known. In particular, they
can be seen in the cycles of regulation and deregulation in
the financial system. At first sight, the cyclical dynamics in
our model appears to be qualitatively similar to the one gov-
erning social dilemma games involving cooperators, defector
and loners [68, 69], in particular the spontaneous emergence
of cyclic dominance and discontinuous phase transitions [70].
However, it must be emphasized that we get cyclical dynamics
due to spatial interactions, not because of an in-built cyclical
dominance between the three strategies. In fact, the role of
ordinary individuals in our model is very different from that
of loners. Loners are traditionally introduced as players ab-
staining from the game and being satisfied with a marginal
return [71]. In contrast, ordinary individuals in our model
are everything but that. They are the main protagonists (the
“masses”), catalyzing both, the rewards to criminals and the
costs to inspectors. While a simplified two-strategy inspection
game with criminals and inspectors provides some elementary
insights, only the inclusion of a third strategy of “ordinary
people” yields reasonably realistic results.
Although we recognize the minimalist nature of our model,
it may eventually change our basic understanding of why,
when and where crime is likely to occur, and how it may be
more efficiently contained. In particular, it is important to rec-
ognize that crime is not simply the result of activities of crimi-
nals. It should be rather viewed as result of social interactions
of people with different behaviors, the collective dynamics re-
sulting from such interactions [72–74], and the spatiotemporal
social context they create. One might thus want to reconsider
the common perspective on crime. The social environment
seems to be quite important for the emergence/occurrence of
crime, and models like ours can help to better explain why so-
cial context matters. In other words, crime may not be well
understood by just assuming a “criminal nature” of particular
individuals (the “criminals”) – this picture probably applies
just to a fraction of people committing crimes. Our results
suggest that changing the social context and conditions may
be able to make a significant contribution to the reduction of
crime. This would have relevant implications for policies and
law.
Extensions of our model might be promising to answer
questions such as the following: How can corruption or orga-
7nized crime be modeled? What other strategies besides peer
inspection and punishment are available, and how are they
changing the evolutionary dynamics? For example, how does
pool punishment (i.e. a public sanctioning system) change
the game and its outcome? Would a reward system con-
tain crime more effectively than a punishment system? And
are reputation systems more efficient than surveillance ap-
proaches? These questions are particularly relevant at a time,
where information and communication technologies make a
Big Brother Society feasible and discussions whether more or
less private weapons are creating a safer world are waiting for
scientific answers.
IV. METHODS
We start Monte Carlo simulations of the evolutionary dy-
namics of the proposed spatial inspection game with uni-
formly distributed strategies, each with an initial fraction of
1/3. The stationary fractions of the three strategies on the
square lattice are determined by means of a random sequen-
tial update comprising the following steps: First, a randomly
selected player x plays the inspection game with all its nearest
neighbors, generating an overall payoff of Psx . Then, one of
the nearest neighbors of player x is chosen randomly, and this
player y is assumed to get the payoff Psy analogously to the
previous player x. Finally, player y is assumed to imitate the
strategy of player x with probability
q =
1
1 + exp[(Psy − Psx)/K]
, (5)
where K determines the level of uncertainty in strategy adop-
tions and the inverse K−1 represents the so-called intensity
of selection. Equation (5) corresponds to the empirically sup-
ported multinomial logit model [75], which for two decision
alternatives is also known as Fermi law. We set K = 0.5 to
account for the traditional assumption that better performing
players are imitated more frequently, although players might
sometimes adopt a less successful strategy (e.g. due to uncer-
tain information or trial-and-error behavior).
In each full time step of the game, all players adopt the
strategy of one of their neighbors once on average. Depend-
ing on the proximity to phase transition points and the typical
size of emerging spatial patterns, the linear system size L is
varied between 200 and 1600. Equilibration in a statistical
sense takes up to 106 full rounds of the game.
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